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BETTER TO LAY IT OUT ON THE TABLE
RATHER THAN DO IT BEHIND THE
CURTAIN: HOSPITALS NEED TO
OBTAIN CONSENT
BEFORE USING NEWLY
DECEASED PATIENTS TO TEACH
RESUSCITATION PROCEDURES
Hospitals in the United States are using newly deceased patients, often
infants, to teach resuscitation procedures to medical students, interns,
and residents without first obtaining consent from the patient's family.'
This practice has been addressed in medical journals for almost a decade.
Recently, however, a survey indicating the prevalence of this practice has
brought the procedure under close scrutiny; new questions have been
raised as researchers continue to expand the frontier of medical
knowledge.2
While most people agree that, ideally, consent should be obtained prior
to allowing deceased patients to be used for teaching purposes, there is
strong disagreement about whether or not consent is a necessity, and the
appropriateness of continuing the practice.3 A court of law has not yet
addressed these issues.4
Part I of this Comment examines the practice of using newly deceased
patients to teach resuscitation techniques to medical trainees, without
first obtaining family consent. Part II evaluates the legal arguments pro-
voked by this practice by comparing and contrasting state statutes and
court decisions in related areas of the law. Part III analyzes the public
policy arguments surrounding the consent requirement. Part IV proposes
1. Do Dead "Patients" Have Rights?, PEOPLE'S MED. Soc'y NEWSL., June 1995, at 5.
2. Jeffrey P. Bums et al., Using Newly Deceased Patients to Teach Resuscitation Proce-
dures, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1652, 1652 (1994). See James P. Orlowski et al., The Ethics of
Using Newly Dead Patients for Teaching and Practicing Intubation Techniques, 319 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 439 (1988).
3. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652. "Although no crisis in the education of trainees
in intubation has occurred, it appears that such a crisis has been averted by the deceptive
practice of using newly dead patients to teach intubation without consent. The practice is
justified; the deception is not." Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 441.
4. See infra Part II; Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1653.
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a change in the current practice that would still allow students to obtain
the training they need and ensure the family's right of consent. Part V
concludes that while the practice scientifically is justifiable, it is morally
wrong to deceive patients' families in order to teach resuscitation skills.
By ensuring family consent prior to intubation training,5 hospitals and
physicians can meet their obligation to train students and their obligation
to respect their patients' families' wishes.
I. THE USE OF NEWLY DEAD PATIENTS IN MEDICAL TRAINING
Both the medical profession and society in general long have accepted
the importance of using human bodies for scientific training and re-
search.6 As long as there have been doctors, however, society has been
wary of their practice.7 Teaching and experimentation involving human
corpses has been viewed with a particularly jaundiced eye;8 therefore,
non-medical people may react emotionally to this controversial intuba-
tion training, yielding reactions ranging from rage to repugnance. 9
Our society treats the deceased with reverence and is distrustful of any
5. Intubation is defined as "[i]nsertion of a tubular device into a canal, hollow organ,
or cavity; specifically, passage of an oro- or nasotrachael tube for anesthesia or for control
of pulmonary ventilation." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 887 (26th ed. 1995).
6. See Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652. See, e.g., Louis LASAGNA, THE DOCTORS'
DILEMMAS 96 (1962); Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Feb. 1985, at 31; Letter from Jeff Stryker to Editor, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 396
(1989) (criticizing Orlowski's ethical standards condoning intubation without familial
consent).
7. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1653-54; Stryker, supra note 6, at 396; LASAGNA,
supra note 6, at 100. Quoting a letter Petrarch wrote to Pope Clement VI, Lasagna writes:
know that your bedside is beleaguered by doctors, and naturally this fills me with
fear. Their opinions are always conflicting, and he who has anything new to say
suffers the shame of limping behind the others .... They traffic with our lives.
With them-not as with other trades-it is sufficient to be called a physician to be
believed to the last word, and yet a physician's life harbours more danger than
any other .... The physician alone has the right to kill with impunity. Oh, Most
Gentle Father, look upon their band as an army of enemies. Remember the
warning epitaph which that unfortunate man had inscribed on his tombstone: 'I
died of too many physicians.'
LASAGNA, supra note 6, at 100.
8. See Feinberg, supra note 6, at 31.
With a cruel zeal for science, some medical men who are called anatomists have
dissected the bodies of the dead, and have inhumanly pried into the secrets of the
human body in order to learn the nature of the disease and its exact seat and how
it might be cured.
LASAGNA, supra note 6, at 97 (quoting St. Augustine).
9. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439, 441. See also Burns et al., supra note 2, at
1652; Feinberg, supra note 6, at 31-33; Stryker, supra note 6, at 396.
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tampering with bodies between the time of death and interment. 10 De-
spite this skepticism, "[scientifically] proved advances in care of the criti-
cally ill patient are expected, accepted, and perhaps even demanded by
society."" Additionally, the quality of the medical profession undoubt-
edly is directly correlated to the degree of excellence in the training avail-
able,12 and this training must, at times, involve practicing on an actual
human body. 3 The dilemma for clinical educators, thus, is attempting to
balance two often conflicting obligations: educating health care providers
in the most comprehensive manner possible, and protecting patients'
physical and psychological integrity. 4
The hospital ethics committee at Children's Hospital in Boston, Massa-
chusetts recently reviewed the hospital's teaching policies and found the
need to formulate a policy regarding the propriety of using newly de-
ceased patients to teach resuscitation procedures. 5 As a starting point,
three doctors, Burns, Reardon, and Truog, were enlisted to conduct a sur-
vey of the directors of United States' hospital training programs "to de-
termine the prevalence of this practice and circumstances under which it
is performed."' 6 The survey, released on December 15, 1994, in the New
England Journal of Medicine, indicated that thirty-nine percent of the re-
sponding programs used newly deceased patients to teach resuscitation
procedures, and of these, "only ten percent required either verbal or writ-
ten consent from the patients' families."' 7
Although the reporting programs indicated that several medical tech-
10. See LASAGNA, supra note 6, at 96, 97 (describing religious views on post-mortem
dissection and use of corpses). See also Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1653.
11. Norman S. Abramson et al., Informed Consent in Resuscitation Research, 246
JAMA 2828, 2828 (1981).
12. See Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439. See Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652.
13. LASAGNA, supra note 6, at 99; Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652.
14. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439.
15. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652.
16. Id. at 1652; See D. Gary Benfield et al., Teaching Intubation Skills Using Newly
Deceased Infants, 265 JAMA 2360 (1991) (discussing a 1987 national survey by T. Craw-
ford in which 20% of responding hospitals reported intubating newly dead patients for
teaching purposes without informing the family).
17. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652. In 1992, of 449 questionnaires mailed, 353
hospital training programs across the country responded.
Of these, 136 (39 percent) described using newly deceased patients [to teach] re-
suscitation. [The programs reporting the highest level of such use were] ... emer-
gency-medicine programs (63 percent) and the neonatal critical care programs (58
percent). Forty percent of programs that used this teaching technique reported
using it 10 or more times per year .... Only 10 percent (13 of 136) of all the
programs ... required either verbal or written consent from the patients' families.
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niques were practiced, they indicated that tracheal intubation was by far
the most frequently performed procedure."8 Tracheal intubation is a
method for providing assistance in breathing by maneuvering an endotra-
cheal tube through the patients' trachea in an effort to open the airway.' 9
Once in place, oxygen is forced through the tube and directly into the
lungs, preventing aspiration of fluid into the lungs."z Intubation is em-
ployed most commonly in emergency situations; thus, speed and precision
are of the utmost importance. 21 In addition to its prevalence in emer-
gency room settings, intubation is also an integral part of neonatal inten-
sive care unit training, where respiratory complications abound.22
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The legality of using newly deceased patients for teaching purposes
without family consent has not been addressed by a court. The rights at
stake and decisions in similar types of cases must be examined in order to
predict how a court would rule on this issue. Both criminal and civil laws
must be reviewed to determine where liability could rest, and at what
consequence.
A. Criminal Implications
At the extreme end of the spectrum, some state laws include statutes
imposing criminal sanctions for dissecting a body without authority and
for abuse of a corpse.23 In New York, for example, removal of a dead
body that is awaiting burial for the purpose of dissection, without author-
18. Id. Procedures reported include the placement of central venous catheters (using
a large needle to enter a vein for the purpose of threading a catheter into it), surgical venus
cutdown (making an incision in the skin to expose an artery or vein), thoracotomy (making
an incision in the chest, often through which to massage the heart), pericardiocentesis (us-
ing a long needle to remove fluid from the sac surrounding the heart), crycothyrotomy
(making an incision in the neck), liver biopsy, and intraosseous needle placement (putting
a needle into bone, often for the purpose of removing marrow). Id.
19. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 887.
20. Letter from James P. Orlowski, M.D. et al., to Editor, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 396,
397 (1989). Intubation also "isolates the airway, keeps it patent, prevents aspiration, per-
mits suctioning of the trachea, ensures the delivery of a high concentration of oxygen to the
lungs, and provides a route for the administration of certain drugs." Id.
21. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439.
22. Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2360. Of 55 infants studied who died at Children's
Medical Center of Akron (Ohio) Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, all but one received respir-
atory assistance. Id. at 2361.
23. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4210-a to 4210-c; 4315-17 (McKinney 1985);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (Anderson 1996); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052
(West 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 71 (West 1990).
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ity of law, constitutes a felony.24 Misdemeanors include dissecting a body
without legal right or permission of the deceased,25 and opening, without
authority of law, "a building wherein the dead body of a human being is
deposited while awaiting burial. . .. for the purpose of dissection, or from
malice or wantonness."26 There is, however, an exception to criminal
sanctions if the person dissecting or performing the autopsy acts in good
faith and is unaware of the decedent's opposition to such procedure. 27
Abuse of a corpse, a misdemeanor of the second degree in Ohio, may
be charged when a person "treat[s] a human corpse in a way that he
knows would outrage reasonable family sensibilities."28 Gross abuse of a
corpse is a felony of the fourth degree, charged against one who "treat[s]
a corpse in a way that would outrage reasonable community
sensibilities. "29
A violation of these laws based on unauthorized dissection or intent to
dissect principles would be difficult to prove with regard to intubation
training, however, because the requisite cutting or dismembering nor-
mally would not be found.3" While retrograde intubation does involve a
minor incision, even this may not meet the degree of dismemberment or
disfigurement necessary to qualify as a dissection.3
Application of the abuse of a corpse statutes, in the context of unau-
thorized intubation, would be more likely to result in successful prosecu-
tion. Family, as well as community, sensibilities certainly could be
outraged when liberties are taken with a body without first consulting the
family. In such case, the court would be forced to weigh the shock and
outrage of the public and the families, against the societal benefits pro-
vided through the training. Ultimately, the court must decide if the hos-
pital or training physician acted knowingly, i.e., even though he knew the
act would outrage reasonable family sensibilities. A court undoubtedly
could justify holding doctors or hospitals criminally liable for abuse of a
24. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4216 (McKinney 1985).
25. Id. at § 4210-a.
26. Id. at § 4218.
27. Id. at § 4210-b.
28. OHio REV. CODE §§ 2927.01(A)&(C) (Anderson 1996) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at §§ 2927.01(B)-(C)(emphasis added).
30. The definition of dissection: "The act of cutting into pieces an animal or vegetable
for the purpose of ascertaining the structure and use of its parts. The anatomical examina-
tion of a dead body by cutting into pieces or exscinding one or more parts or organs."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 472 (6th ed. 1990).
31. See infra note 117.
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corpse when unauthorized liberties have been taken knowingly with
newly deceased patients.
B. Civil Implications
Civil actions, as well as criminal, are available. Several claims, includ-
ing statutorily based actions for money damages, have been raised in re-
sponse to interference with dead bodies.3" Cases involving organ
donation and autopsies are analogous because the body at issue is not a
living patient with rights in and of itself, instead a third party must assert
a violation of rights claim. Courts have struggled to define what rights to
recognize in the families of the deceased,33 as well as how to formulate
suitable remedies.34
32. See Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio 1989) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search and seizure violation did not apply when the county cor-
oner, while fulfilling his legal duty, performed an autopsy on plaintiff's wife against his
wishes); Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims may be brought successfully
against agents of the state in this case for the removal of decedents' eyeballs or corneas);
Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery, 514 N.E.2d 430, 431-35 (Ohio 1986) (awarding $56,000 to
the plaintiffs based on infliction of emotional distress and mishandling of a dead body
when cemetery knowingly dug up the remains of plaintiff's relative and discarded them in a
refuse pile so that another body could be buried in its place); Muniz v. United Hosp., 379
A.2d 57, 58 (N.J. 1977) (suggesting potential tort claims of outrage, breach of implied con-
tract, infliction of emotional distress, and medical malpractice against a hospital that mis-
placed plaintiff's dead infant for three weeks); Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249,
249 (1917) (awarding plaintiff damages for mental anguish, suffering, and nervous shock
when plaintiff's father's body was cast into the sea by defendant cruise ship, 20 hours from
port, as plaintiff was waiting to exercise his right of possession for burial); Lacy v. Cooper
Hosp., 745 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-36 (D.N.J. 1990) (denying plaintiff's claim of negligence and
medical malpractice when defendant physician performed pericardiocentesis on a newly
deceased patient without familial consent).
33. See Burney v. Children's Hosp. in Boston, 47 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1897) (holding that
plaintiff may bring an action against the hospital that performed an autopsy on the body of
his dead child without his consent); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1976) (finding that an autopsy may be performed over the religious objection of
decedent's family when that state has a compelling reason for its requirement). "[T]his
court rejects the theory that a surviving custodian has quasi-property rights in the body of
the deceased, and acknowledges the cause of action for mishandling of a dead body as a
subspecies of the tort of infliction of serious emotional distress." Carney v. Knollwood
Cemetery, 514 N.E.2d 430, 435 (Ohio 1986).
34. See generally Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984) (denying plaintiff dam-
ages because no physical injury accompanied the emotional distress negligently inflicted
upon her when medical examiner failed to return organs to her deceased husband's body
following autopsy); Detling v. Chockley, 436 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1982) (finding conscious
and deliberate disregard for others interests as a prerequisite to a punitive damages
award); Schwartz v. State, 616 N.Y.S.2d 921, 928 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1994) (awarding parents
$7,500 in damages for unauthorized performance of autopsy on their deceased inmate son
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1. Whose Rights Are Involved?
The first step in determining whether the deceased patient's family
would have civil claims against a physician or hospital, for unauthorized
use of the body for teaching purposes, is establishing "whose" rights are
at issue. It is a well settled legal principle that every living person has
rights in his or her own body.35 The precise parameters of this right are
far from clear. The United States Supreme Court, however, has recog-
nized that the right is not absolute, and thus state regulation is appropri-
ate.36 For example, a person's body is her property in that she can
permanently color it with a tatoo, yet she is not permitted to go so far as
to sell organs or "sell her entire body" in the form of prostitution.37
Regardless of how these amorphous property rights in one's body are
defined, such rights extinguish at death and are not transferable to the
estate of the decedent.38 Therefore, claims must be brought by someone
with an interest in the deceased patient's body. The claimant most likely
will be the spouse or family, because they have personal feelings at stake
and possess legal rights with regard to the corpse. 39 The type and extent
in violation of their religious beliefs and objections); Carney, 514 N.E.2d at 430 (awarding
$56,000 to the plaintiffs based on infliction of emotional distress and mishandling of a dead
body when cemetery knowingly dug up the remains of plaintiffs relative and discarded
them in a refuse pile so that another body could be buried in its place).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973) (discussing privacy rights held by a preg-
nant woman in her own body). See also Courtney S. Campbell, Body, Self, and the Prop-
erty Paradigm, HASTiNGs CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 34, 37.
The paradigm not only places boundaries around the body, to keep others from
intruding on the body or invading one's property, but also excludes others from
choices about the body, or from intervening in decisions of an intimate nature.
The language of property thus functions to give persons control, and it is a part of
the general concept of property that this be a right to exclusive control.
Id.
36. Id. The landmark Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, makes clear that while
individuals may make many decisions regarding their bodies, this discretion is not without
limits. Privacy rights are not absolute and must at times give in to state regulation. 410
U.S. at 153. Courtney Campbell favors a unique possessory right and points out one ex-
treme implication if a person's body had all of the characteristics and features of property:
a person could lose her property, i.e. body, in payment of a debt, due to the executable
nature of property. Campbell, supra note 35, at 39-40.
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (Deering 1995) (stating that any person who solicits,
agrees to engage in, or who engages in any act of prostitution is guilty of a misdemeanor).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
38. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1986) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
39. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 8A:5-18 (West 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4210-c
(McKinney 1985).
If, however, the gravamen of the action is the mental anguish resulting from the
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of these rights, however, is far from clear.4"
2. Quasi Property Rights
The judiciary's struggle to define what rights over a deceased person's
body a family possesses can be seen as early as 1897 in Burney v. Chil-
dren's Hospital in Boston.4 In Burney, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts held that a father had a cause of action against a hospital that had
been treating his son and then performed an autopsy on the newly de-
ceased child's body without the father's consent.42 The court looked to
England as well as other state decisions and found no property right in
the body of the dead.43 Instead, the court recognized a right of posses-
sion for purposes of burial and other lawful disposition:44 This "quasi"
property right to the body of a deceased family member has been ac-
cepted in most states.45 The dilemma remains in identifying the rights
that accompany a declared "quasi" property right.46 William Prosser
act done to the dead body, it would seem that any one who suffered mentally
from the act should have a right of action. Almost all courts, however, limit the
right of suit to the surviving spouse, or if none, to the next of kin. Were the dead
body property which would pass by the laws of intestacy, the action might be
considered in the nature of a suit in trespass by the owner of the body. But if the
plaintiff wins simply because he has suffered mentally there seems to be no basis
for a rule that allows one individual a right of action and denies it to another who
has essentially identical interests and has suffered equally from the wrong.
Harry R. Bigelow', Jr., Damages: Pleading: Property: Who May Recover for Wrongful Dis-
turbance of a Dead Body, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 111 (1933-34).
40. See supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
41. 47 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1897).
42. Id. at 401.
43. Id. at 401-02.
44. Id. at 401.
45. See Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, 327 S.E.2d 438, 440-41 (W.Va. 1985);
Painter v. United States Fid. & Guar., 91 A. 158 (Md. 1914); Patrick v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins., 118 S.W.2d 116, 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Brown v. Broome, 197 N.Y.S.2d 679,
680, 681 (1960); Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 47 S.W.2d 1004, 1005 (Ky. App. 1932); Snyder
v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 340 (Md. Ct. App. 1976).
46. That there is no right of property in a dead body, using the word in its ordi-
nary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the dead is a subject which
interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of
actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to
be discharged by some one towards the dead, - a duty, and we may also say a
right, to protect from violation, and a duty on the part of others to abstain from
violation. It may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi property, and it would
be discreditable to any system of law not to provide a remedy in such a case.
Burney, 47 N.E. at 402 (quoting Pierce v. Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237 (1872)). New York
also has recognized a right of possession:
The right is to the possession of the corpse in the same condition it was in when
Better to Lay it Out on the Table
writes:
[C]ourts have talked of a somewhat dubious 'property right' to
the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while the
decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for
the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value
but is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It seems reason-
ably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out of
thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal
feelings of the survivors which are being protected, under a fic-
tion likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.47
3. Causes of Action
a. Tort Claims: Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital,48 plaintiffs' twenty-
year-old son was diagnosed as brain dead, and yet, he was kept alive on
life support machines for several days despite his parents' requests to the
contrary.49 Plaintiffs claimed successfully that the hospital negligently
withheld the body from the family, and "posed a plain affront to their
dignity and autonomy and exposed them to unnecessary distress at'a time
of profound grief."5
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that "for more than a half cen-
tury this state has recognized a quasi property right in the body of a dead
person."'" The court held that the hospital was negligent in its failure to
death supervened. It is a right to what remains when the breath leaves the body,
and not merely to such a hacked, hewed, and mutilated corpse as some stranger,
an offender against the criminal law, may choose to turn over to the afflicted
relative.
Id. (quoting Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y. Supp. 471 (1896)). But see Carney v. Knollwood
Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434-35 (finding that "'quasi property' seems to be simply
another convenient 'hook' upon which liability is hung [ ] merely ... concealing the real
basis for damages, which is mental anguish"); Scarpaci v. Milwaukee Co., 292 N.W.2d 816,
820, 822 (1980) (denying any property rights in a dead body but finding for plaintiffs under
tort theory of infliction of mental suffering based on a personal right of a family of the
deceased to bury the body).
47. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 43-44 (2d ed. 1955).
48. 538 A.2d 346 (N.J. 1988).
49. Id. at 347-48. The hospital, while trying to convince the parents to donate their
son's organs for transplant, kept the body alive on life support for several days after previ-
ously pronouncing him brain dead. Id. at 348.
50. Id. at 351.
51. Id.
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honor the parents' request for the body.52 In addition, the court implied
that there is no distinct tort for the mishandling of a corpse, but rather
that the tort actually was based on the wrongful infliction of emotional
distress.53 The court went on to imply that the resulting harm necessary
for a plaintiff to establish an emotional distress claim is often difficult to
prove. This is true because the court is leery of spurious claims, unsup-
ported by tangible evidence such as physical injury.54 When the issue
involves negligent mishandling of a corpse, however, courts more easily
are convinced of the harm element."
In Lacy v. Cooper Hospital/University Medical Center,56 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of New Jersey agreed that mishandling a corpse is not a tort in
and of itself, but rather it "is actionable only as a cause of action for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. '57 The court ex-
plained the necessary elements in a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress: 1) "the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly," 2)
such conduct must be so outrageous as to be "utterly intolerable in a
civilized community," 3) such conduct is the proximate cause of the emo-
tional distress, and 4) the emotional distress would be unbearably severe
for a reasonable person to withstand.58 For negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress the plaintiff must show: 1) the defendant owed a duty to
52. Id. at 350-51.
53. Id. at 352-53; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979) (recogniz-
ing a tort of interfering with the right of burial based on infliction of emotional distress, not
quasi property rights). "One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, with-
holds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its proper inter-
ment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is
entitled to the disposition of the body." Id.
54. Strachan, 538 A.2d at 353.
55. Id. "Legal authorities have long acknowledged the likelihood of mental anguish
resulting from the mishandling of dead bodies." Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n,
514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio App. 1986). What all of these cases appear to have in common
is "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, . . . which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious." Strachan, 538 A.2d at 353.
As to the possibility of actions based on fictitious injuries, a court should not
deny recovery for a type of wrong which may result in serious harm because some
people may institute fraudulent actions. Our trial courts retain sufficient control,
through the rules of evidence and the requirements as to the sufficiency of evi-
dence, to safeguard against the danger that juries will find facts without legally
adequate proof .... To hold that all honest claims should be barred merely be-
cause otherwise some dishonest ones would prevail is stretching the public policy
concept very close to the breaking point.
Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. 1965).
56. 745 F. Supp. 1029 (D.N.J. 1990).
57. Id. at 1034.
58. Id. at 1034-35.
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the plaintiff, 2) the defendant breached that duty, and 3) the plaintiff was
injured as a result of the breach.59
In Lacy, the parents of the decedent brought claims of emotional dis-
tress against a hospital for repeating a medical procedure (pericardi-
ocentesis) on the body of their son after he had been pronounced dead.6"
The court concluded that the mental distress suffered by the family was
not severe enough to meet the requirements for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress; the hospital was not held liable for its
acts.6 '
In determining whether there is a possible claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress against a doctor or hospital for using a newly
deceased patient to teach intubation techniques, the four necessary ele-
ments of the cause of action must be evaluated. The first question is
whether the hospital or doctor acted intentionally or recklessly. Clearly,
there was the intention to perform the teaching technique. Whether or
not this act was reckless is debatable. Doctors and hospitals may argue
that it is not reckless because the practice is necessary in gaining medical
expertise. Conversely, patients' families may contend that while training
is necessary, so too is consent.
The second issue is whether performing intubation training on the
newly dead is so outrageous as to be intolerable to a civilized community.
Hospitals could find support in Lacy to argue that their conduct, is not
outrageous. They might argue that the conduct is required in a society
that demands skilled medical professionals. Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
will rely on the recognized importance of respect toward the dead, and
the ensuing need for consent. Plaintiffs also may cite studies suggesting
that there are enough people willing to consent to provide adequate
learning opportunities. 62
The third element requires a showing that the practice of intubation is-
the proximate cause of the emotional distress. While medical personnel
may argue that the death alone was the cause of the family's distress, a
court would not be unjust in siding with plaintiffs' in their claim of proxi-
59. Id. at 1035. The hospital "has a duty to meet the standard of care reasonably to be
expected of [one] dealing with corpses." Id. But see Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th
Cir. 1984) (finding "[uJnder Arkansas law, damages for emotional distress caused by negli-
gence are not recoverable unless accompanied by physical injury").
60. Lacy, 745 F. Supp. at 1032.
61. Id. at 1036.
62. See Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2360; Robert M. McNamara et al., Requesting
Consent for an Invasive Procedure in Newly Dead Adults, 273 JAMA 310, 310 (1995).
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mate cause; the court might find the training performed on the deceased
patient's body, and not the patient's death, was the cause of the emo-
tional distress. To successfully assert a claim of proximate cause, a plain-
tiff must convince the court that the-emotional distress resulting from
nonconsensual intubation training is unbearably severe. The court's per-
ception of the severity of the injury is pivotal to the decision.63 While
medical personnel could attempt to convince the court of the necessity
and relative insignificance of the actions, there are many public policy
arguments discussed below that support the plaintiff family's claim of un-
bearable emotional distress.
Plaintiffs may also make a strong case that the nonconsensual practice
of intubation on their deceased loved one constitutes negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Doctors and hospitals have a duty to respect the
wishes of deceased patients' families, and must prove that they also have
fulfilled the duty of treating the corpses with reasonable care.64 If plain-
tiffs can prove that intubation training occurred without their consent,
then they have a strong argument that these duties were breached. Fi-
nally, plaintiffs could aver severe injury, based on the intense suffering
they experienced upon learning that their loved one had been violated
immediately following his or her death. A court could thus reasonably
find in favor of a decedent's family on both intentional and negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress claims.
b. Similarities to Cornea Removal Statutes
"The threat of criminal sanctions could be eliminated by the passage of
new legislation expressly permitting the use of corpses for nondisfiguring
training purposes., 65 This suggestion is based upon a recent trend in
state legislation; several newly enacted statutes now allow for the removal
of the corneas of deceased persons under certain circumstances. 66 Michi-
gan's statute, which is similar to those of many states, dictates that cornea
removal is permitted only when: an autopsy is authorized by the county
medical examiner, the examiner has no knowledge of an objection to the
cornea removal by the decedent's family, and the removal will not disfig-
63. See Lacy, 745 F. Supp. 1029.
64. Id. at 1035.
65. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 441.
66. See MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10202 (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.9185 (West 1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (Anderson 1994); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-23-6 (1996).
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ure or alter the decedent's appearance.67 Under this and similar statutes,
families have asserted claims for relief based on the removal of the de-
ceased's corneas without their consent.68 Although the courts have strug-
gled with these cases, their decisions have resulted in the majority of
families being forced to leave the courtroom empty handed.69 An exami-
nation of the issues presented in these cases is useful in determining po-
tential causes of action available to a family for nonconsensual tracheal
intubation, and also may be helpful in forecasting how such claims would
fare.
In State v. Powell,7" a decedent's family brought an action attacking
Florida's cornea removal statute, § 732.9185. 71 This statute is more re-
strictive than the generally sketched guidelines above. It permits the re-
moval of the corneas only when an eye bank has requested the cornea for
transplant, the decedent is under the jurisdiction of the medical examiner,
and an autopsy is required by law.72 Significantly, the statute releases the
examiner from all criminal and civil liability for failure to obtain con-
sent.73 The plaintiffs in Powell claimed no notice had been provided nor
had consent been requested prior to the wrongful removal of their son's
corneas.
74
The plaintiffs set forth five legal arguments in their pursuit for" relief.
First, they attacked the statute as an unconstitutional expansion of legisla-
tive power.75 In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "[W]e recog-
nize that a legislative act carries with it the presumption of validity and
the party challenging a statute's constitutionality must carry the burden
of establishing that the statute bears no reasonable relation to a permissi-
ble legislative objective. ' 76 The court discussed the importance of the
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10202(2) (West 1992).
68. See supra notes 70-99 and accompanying text. See also Georgia Lions Eye Bank,
Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (upholding cornea removal statute as constitu-
tional despite plaintiff's claim that her deceased infant's cornea tissue was removed without
notice or opportunity to object).
69. But see Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (allowing recovery
for plaintiff, whose husband's corneas were removed without her consent, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
70. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
71. Id. at 1190.
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.9185 (West 1983).
73. Id. § 732.9185.
74. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1190.
75. ld..
76. Id. (citing Johns v. Mays, 402 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. 1981)).
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goals of the statute.77 In addition, the court pointed out that the number
of people who have benefitted from the cornea transplants under the stat-
utorily permitted removal has increased vastly in comparison to the vol-
untary donation system in place prior to the statute's enactment. 78 The
court further stated that the removal of corneas is a minor intrusion with
minimal lasting traces as compared with autopsy procedures. 79 Based on
those facts, the court was comfortable in upholding the constitutionality
of the statute; it implied that the immense benefits to society outweigh
the minor personal sacrifice.8°
The second claim advanced was one of property rights, and like the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Snyder v. Holy Cross Hospital,81
the Florida Supreme Court declared that there are no property rights in
the body of a deceased family member.82 In refusing to find an elevated
"quasi" property right, Powell held that the rights of the next of kin are
77. Id. at 1190-91.
78. Id. at 1191. Prior to the statute's enactment in 1977, only 500 corneas in Florida
were obtained for transplant in 1976. In 1985, after the statute was enacted, 3,000 were
made available. Additionally, many corneas obtained prior to the statute's enactment
were unusable due to the advanced age of most donors. In 1985, approximately 80-85% of
the corneas obtained were suitable for transplant. Id. at 1191.
79. Id.
80. Id.
'The preservation of the public health is one of the duties devolving upon the
State as a sovereign power. In fact, among all the objects sought to be secured by
governmental laws, none is more important than the preservation of the public
health'. . . . 'Health regulations are of the utmost consequence to the general
welfare; and if they are reasonable, impartial, and not against the general policy
of the State, they must be submitted to by individuals for the good of the public,
irrespective of pecuniary loss.'
Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (quoting Abel v. State, 13 S.E.2d 507
(Ga.Ct.App. 1941)). But see Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,482-83 (6th Cir. 1991).
While the court found the statute contained "intentional ignorance" to bypass the consent
requirement, and would not tolerate this, the dissent argued that the value to society out-
weighs any other interests as there are no property rights in the body. Id.
81. 352 A.2d 334, 340-41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
82. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1191.
It is recognized universally that there is no property in a dead body in a commer-
cial or material sense. '[I]t is not part of the assets of the estate (though its dispo-
sition may be affected by the provision of the will); it is not subject to replevin; it
is not property in a sense that will support discovery proceedings; it may not be
held as security for funeral costs; . . . it is not common law larceny to steal a
corpse. Rights in a dead body exist ordinarily only for purposes of burial and,
except with statutory authorization, for no other purpose.'
Snyder, 352 A.2d at 340 n.12 (quoting P.E. JACKSON, THE LAWS OF CADAVERS AND OF
BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES (2d ed. 1950)).
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limited to possession of the body for purposes of burial.8 3
The third claim addressed was whether § 732.9185 acted as a "taking"
of private property by state action for a non-public purpose in violation
of the Florida Constitution. 4 The court rejected this claim because of its
earlier finding that there is no property at issue.85 Plaintiffs may have
common law rights in support of a tort action. A loss of these rights,
however, is not the equivalent of a constitutional taking and does not
necessarily constitute a substantive due process violation.86
The plaintiff's fourth claim was that their right to control the remains of
their deceased child constitutes a "fundamental right of personal liberty
protected against unreasonable government intrusion by the due process
clause",87 of the United States Constitution. In relying on a series of
Supreme Court decisions, the plaintiffs attempted to equate their interest
in the deceased patient's body to the privacy rights already recognized
under the due process clause.88 The court rejected this attempt, distin-
guishing constitutionally protected fundamental rights, from the family's
ordinary right "to a tort claim for interference with burial.",8 9 It empha-
sized that in the area of public health, some government intrusion on in-
dividual privacy will be tolerated.90
Finally, plaintiffs argued to overturn the statute, claiming that it vio-
lated the equal protection clause by invidiously discriminating against the
next of kin in cases where autopsies were required by law. 91 The court
rebuffed this attack by drawing support from the Supreme Court and con-
cluding that some statutes inevitably will treat some people differently
than others.92
Although the court held that § 732.9185 is constitutional, the majority
83. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192. See also Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 335 S.E.2d at 128.
But see Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 479. Plaintiff claimed a violation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the court found the necessary elements were present for such
claim: "(1) [d]eprivation, (2) of property, (3) under color of state law." Id.
84. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1193. Plaintiffs wanted the court to evaluate the statute under strict scrutiny,
arguing that it infringed on a fundamentally protected right of family privacy. Id.
88. Id. The plaintiffs cited a string of Supreme Court cases which protect free choice
in fundamental decisions found to be important to the family. Id.
89. Id. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that "only per-
sonal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
... are included in [the] guarantee of personal privacy").
90. Powell, 479 So. 2d at 1193.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979)).
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realized the sensitive nature of the issues involved and invited the legisla-
ture to reevaluate the statute in light of public policy concerns:
[W]e note that laws regarding the removal of human tissues for
transplantation implicate moral, ethical, theological, philosophi-
cal, and economic concerns which do not readily lend them-
selves to analysis within a traditional legal framework.
Applying constitutional standards of review to section 732.9185
obscures the fact that at the heart of the issue lies a policy ques-
tion which calls for a delicate balancing of societal needs and
individual concerns more appropriately accomplished by the
legislature.93
Judge Shaw wrote a strong dissent arguing for the elevation of the next of
kin's rights. 94 Judge Shaw took the position that the families' interests
are protected as religious, liberty, and property rights under the Florida
Constitution.9 Judge Shaw also pointed to § 732.9185(1)(b) which recog-
nizes a families' right to prevent the donation of a decedent's cornea.96
His conclusion was that this legislative grant of the power to object must
have been based on a right of control by the family.97 He expressed con-
cern that the majority was speaking with its heart based on its desire to
provide the blind with opportunities to see, yet was straying from the
letter of the law.98 Judge Shaw's dissent reflected concern that at a time
of once unimaginable medical advancements, the majority cast a severe
blow to personal autonomy and individual rights.
99
In contrast to Powell, the decedent's wife in Brotherton v. Cleveland
was successful in bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal court for the
wrongful removal of her husband's corneas. 10° The Ohio statute in ques-
tion, Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2108.60, is similar to that in Pow-
ell.' The Sixth Circuit in Brotherton found: a) deprivation, b) of
93. Powell, 479 So. 2d at 1194.
94. Id. at 1195 (Shaw, J. dissenting). See also Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335
S.E.2d 127, 129 (1985) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (arguing that the cornea removal statute
fails to give adequate notice and opportunity to object, and is therefore violative of due
process).
95. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1195.
96. Id. at 1198.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
101. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (Anderson 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.9185
(West 1995). Both statutes permit the removal of the corneas of decedents when: an au-
topsy is required by law, the removal will not interfere with the autopsy, and the coroner or
medical examiner has no knowledge of objection. Both statutes protect those removing
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property, c) under color of state law, and thus, it determined that the
plaintiff presented a valid due process claim.10 2
In struggling with the property analysis, the court declared that
"[a]lthough the existence of an interest may be a matter of state law,
whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitle-
ment' protected by the due process clause is determined by federal
law."' 01 3 The court'went on to find the bundle of rights held by the plain-
tiff under Ohio statutory and case law was substantial enough to support
her claim.' Eager to attack the failure of the Ohio statute to adequately
ensure consent, the majority found that the law induced "intentional ig-
norance" on the part of the persons removing the corneas, and held that
the interests of the next of kin are important enough to justify ensuring
consent.
105
Four years after Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit, in Whaley v. County of
Tuscola,10 6 revisited the question of whether decedent's relatives were
deprived of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due pro-.
cess when Michigan state medical examiners removed a decedent's cor-
neas or eyes without prior consent.10 7 The court found that "Michigan
[law] recognizes the same basic rights in a deceased person's body as
Ohio, [and therefore] Brotherton controls." 0 8 In concluding that the
plaintiffs did have an actionable right to the deceased relative's body, the
court relied on a combination of state statutory and common law to jus-
tify this implied right.' 09
the corneas from civil and criminal liability based on a lack of consent, as long as they act
in good faith and without knowledge of objection. Neither statute mandates that the per-
son removing the corneas must attempt to obtain consent; instead .the concern is only with
known objections.
102. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 479-82.
103. Id. at 481-82 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9
(1978)).
104. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
105. Id.
106. 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 1112. The court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment is only rele-
vant when a state deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
So the question here is "whether the next of kin have a property interest in the body,
including the eyes, of a deceased relative." Id. at 1113.
108. Id. at 1114. "The Supreme Court of Michigan has repeatedly held that the next of
kin 'are entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes, and that it is an
actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or muti-
lating it in any way."' Id. at 1115 (quoting Doxtator v. Chicago & W. Mich. R.R., 79 N.W.
922 (Mich. 1899)).
109. Id. at 1114-15. The court found that Michigan law grants the next of kin virtually
the same rights as does Ohio, and therefore Brotherton and its acknowledgement of a
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While it is uncertain how a court would treat claims of criminal or civil
violations against doctors or hospitals for non-consensual intubation
training, the possibilities of guilt and conviction are very real.110 Powell
suggests that a statute allowing intubation training without consent could
be upheld on the basis of legitimate state interests over a non-disfiguring
procedure."1 In the absence of such a statute, however, the threat of
criminal sanctions is not eliminated. Under current law, hospitals and
doctors continuing to train on newly deceased patients without the fam-
ily's consent are risking legal recourse.
III. PUBLIC POLICY
The legality of nonconsensual resuscitation training on the newly dead
is purely speculative; thus, it is valuable to consider public policy argu-
ments that may bear on a court's decision. These factors, when weighed
in their entirety, provide strong support for requiring medical personnel
to obtain consent prior to taking liberties with newly deceased patients.
A. Availability and Need for Consent
One major factor to consider when evaluating the appropriateness of
using newly deceased patients to teach intubation skills is the evidence
that consent can be obtained in a majority of situations.112 Dr. Benfield
and his colleagues at the Regional Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Chil-
dren's Medical Center in Akron, Ohio, performed a study to evaluate the
responses of families of newly deceased infants when consent was re-
quested to intubate the child's body for teaching purposes." 3 The results
indicated that seventy-three percent of the families who were asked
granted permission for the procedure." 4
constitutionally protected property interest in the dead body of a relative applies. Id. at
1116. These interests include the right to dispose of the body in limited circumstances, to
make a gift of the body in certain instances, to possess the body for burial, and prevent its
mutilation. Id. at 1116-17. The legal label given to these rights does not effect their status
as constitutionally protected property because regardless of name, the essence of these
rights closely corresponds with the traditional "bundle of rights" idea of property. Id. at
1117.
110. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 35, at 35.
111. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986). See also infra notes 70-93 and accompanying text.
112. Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2360; McNamara et al., supra note 62, at 310.
113. Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2360.
114. Id. The Regional Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) at Children's Medical
Center in Akron, Ohio, is a specialized facility for treatment of severe neonatal complica-
tions. Id. Dr. Benfield's study was designed to examine both the usefulness of intubation
training, as well as the procedure for ensuring consent. Id. The study lasted from Septem-
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Dr. McNamara and his colleagues conducted a similar study at the
Medical College of Pennsylvania Hospital. 115 Families of newly deceased
adults were asked to consent to the teaching of retrograde tracheal intu-
bation." 6 This procedure, used when traditional intubation fails, is more
invasive because a tube is threaded into the trachea through a hole punc-
tured in the cricothyroid membrane. 117 This study found that fifty-nine
percent of the families were willing to consent to the teaching
procedure.' 18
The studies reveal that death of a family member commonly is a stress-
ful experience, not only for families but for doctors and trainees as
well." 9 These feelings of apprehension and discomfort are intensified
when the newly deceased patients are used in clinical training without
family consent. 12° Therefore, easing the minds of medical trainees, not
ber 1988 to June 1989, during which 50 resident physicians and 21 respiratory therapists
received training at the NICU. Id. at 2361, 2362.
During the 10 month study period, 55 infants died at the center. Id. at 2361. All but one
received respiratory assistance. Id. Of the 55, 44 requests for consent to intubate were
made of the family. Id. at 2360. Of those requests, 32 (73%) were granted. Id. at 2360.
The reasons given for not requesting to intubate 11 of the infants were that: a) the situation
was too emotional, b) the couple was disagreeing as to an autopsy request, c) two infants
died at the same time, making it unnecessary to ask both, and d) one died with a physical
condition making it unsuitable for intubation training. Id. at 2361.
Most of the parents who did not consent based their refusal on feelings that their child
had been through enough. Id. at 2361-62. Those who consented to the training indicated a
desire to help, and possibly save, another child. Id.
115. McNamara et al., supra note 62, at 310.
116. Id.
117. Id. Retrograde tracheal intubation involves "puncturing the cricothyroid mem-
brane with a needle, threading a flexible tip guidewire through the needle, advancing the
guidewire cephalad, recovering it in the oropharynx, and using the guidewire as a stent
over which an endotracheal tube is passed into the trachea." Id. at 310.
118. Id. In Dr. McNamara's study, consent was requested of the next of kin within
three hours of the patient's death. Id. Of 44 requests, consent was granted in 26 instances
(59%). Id. The persons requesting consent had no prior relationship with the family ex-
cept in two cases. Id. Six of nine telephone requests were successful. Id. at 311. Success
was greater in "unexpected" (77%) versus "expected" (41%) deaths. Id. at 310-11.
119. Id. at 312; Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2362.
120. McNamara et al., supra note 62, at 310; Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2362.
When asked about the emotions involved with practicing intubation on newly dead infants,
one resident physician in Dr. Benfield's study responded, "As long as parents agree to
allow intubation, I feel comfortable about doing it. Once, as a medical student, we prac-
ticed on a deceased patient without family permission and I felt very uncomfortable doing
it." Id. A survey was given to nurses and nursing students in London, England, to mea-
sure their emotional responses to use of newly deceased patients to teach. A majority of
both groups found the practice difficult to participate in and commented that they would
feel much more comfortable if consent were granted first. Letter from S.S. Tachakra et al.
to Editor, 266 JAMA 1649, 1650 (1991).
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just families, is yet another.reason to require consent.
Those who favor the continuation of using newly deceased patients as
teaching tools despite a lack of consent offer several sound, though un-
convincing, reasons in support of their conviction. One argument relies
strictly on the need to educate physicians in this procedure; 121 some doc-
tors argue that the need is so acute that it warrants an exception to in-
formed consent. 122 Others feel that the procedure is just not invasive
enough to require consent. 123 Others still say the social benefits, lack of
risk to the deceased patient, and minimal likelihood of upsetting the fam-
ily mandate an exception to requiring consent. 2 4 Simply balancing both
sides of the argument and coming out in favor of medical advancements
over sentiment is yet another approach. 125
1. Proposed Alternatives to Consent
One suggestion that has been made is to have the patient or the pa-
tient's parents sign a blanket permission form when admitted to the hos-
pital or ICU, rather than asking for consent after a patient has died.126
This policy could serve as a sufficient legal safeguard, but the drawbacks
are that it is both under and overinclusive.
The proposal is underinclusive because it does not account for patients
who enter the hospital as emergency cases, or who experience sudden
changes, turning a routine condition suddenly into a critical, life threaten-
ing one. These patients might not have the opportunity to sign a blanket
consent form either because they arrive at the hospital already unable to
consent, or because their hospital stay begins because of a condition so
121. Gina Kolata, Hospitals Use Bodies of Dead for Practice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994,
at A22.
122. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 441.
123. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1652. In contrast, others argue thatany intervention
upon the body of a newly deceased patient warrants family consent. Stryker, supra note 6,
at 396. "[E]ntry into the bodily sanctuary without both special authorization and a
profound purpose (saving life, restoring quality of life) constitutes intrusion." Campbell,'
supra note 35, at 35.
124. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1653.
125. Feinberg, supra note 6, at 35.
To be sure persons sometimes need to "learn how to shudder," but it is even more
commonly the case that people have to learn how not to shudder. Newly dead
bodies cannot be made live again, nor can they be made to vanish forever in a
puff of smoke .... [M]edically useful practices need not be done crudely, indis-
creetly, or disrespectfully. They are the work of professionals and can be done
with dignity.
Id.
126. Kolata, supra note 121.
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minor that it does not justify contemplating death and presenting the con-
sent form. Arguably, this is an extremely important group, as it is in
these types of critical situations that resuscitation procedures most often
are required; consequently, the medical professionals working in this area
are in the most need of competence in these extreme procedures.
127
The blanket permission form is overinclusive because while it may be
unnecessary to teach resuscitation techniques on every person who dies
in the hospital, the form should be given to all patients, as standard pro-
cedure, so that hospital personnel do not have to guess who most likely
will die shortly in their determination of who to provide a form. Further-
more, in the name of time and cost management, the form should be an
all-or-nothing type of release, granting consent to the practice of even the
most extreme procedures if the opportunity were to arise. The amount of
detail that necessarily must be included in such a release may, however
discourage patients from consenting to any form of teaching use of their
body.
Another proposed alternative to requesting consent of the family is to
adopt a strategy that presumes consent.12 8 Advocates of. this approach
argue that once the practice is disclosed to the public, making them aware
of the needs and benefits of such training, "potential patients will be able
to refuse the procedure by advance directive.'
129
Aside from the fact that presumed consent on its face is an "ethically
problematic concept," 130 this solution suffers under scrutiny for several
reasons. First, it is unreasonable to assume that, prior to the need for
hospitalization, patients and their families will be aware of the practice of
using newly deceased patients as teaching devices. Due to this potential
lack of awareness, the practice is too controversial to relieve the medical
profession of the duty of ensuring specific informed consent.' 3' The vast
number of deaths that result directly from emergency situations further
complicates the issue. Emergency patients often die suddenly, and they
may never have considered granting permission to use their bodies as
teaching tools. Yet, in spite of that possibility, their silence would be read
as consent. Second, many people hold religious convictions that oppose
127. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1653; McNamara et al., supra note 62, at 312.
128. Letter from Guttorm Brattebo et al.,-to Editor, 274 JAMA 128, 129 (1995). See
also Orlowski, supra note 2, at 441.
129. Brattebo et al., supra note 128, at 129.
130. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 440.
131. Intubation certainly is less invasive than organ donation or an autopsy; however,
the fact that presumed consent is not accepted in those instances indicates a societal rejec-
tion of such a liberal approach. See Stryker, supra note 6, at 396.
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any use or disturbance of the bodies of the dead. 132 Respect of their
wishes could be guaranteed only by specific consent.
Finally, philosophically, by implying consent in the absence of a clear
indication from the patient, people who want to actively help medicine
are denied the opportunity to make a freely given "gift.' 133 Weighing
voluntary organ donation against routine organ salvaging through pre-
sumed consent, ethicist Paul Ramsey argued that "[t]he routine taking of
organs would deprive individuals of the exercise of the virtue of generos-
ity."1 34 Ramsey found that the symbolic value in "giving" would tip the
scale toward a voluntary, consent driven system, despite the vast social
benefits that would result from routine "salvaging.' 135
The shortcomings listed above demand that doctors request consent
from the families of deceased patients prior to, and directly in contempla-
tion, of the specific procedures to be practiced. While the moment of the
request may be an awkward and uneasy one for both doctors and fami-
lies, the thought of hospitals taking liberties with deceased patients' bod-
ies certainly seems more unnerving.
B. Need for Trained Personnel
The importance of timely and successful intubation on a living patient
cannot be minimized.' 36 If the procedure is performed incorrectly, pre-
cious time is lost and death may result needlessly.' 37 Proponents of the
practice of intubation on deceased patients argue that it is the only
method by which medical trainees can adequately learn the procedure. 38
They further argue that mannequins, animals, and, even cadavers fail to
132. See id. See also infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.
133. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
210, 214 (1974). Ramsey's article discusses organ donation and salvaging, but by con-
senting to intubation practice, the deceased's body similarly has been given to science. Id.
134. Id. at 210.
135. Id. Ramsey observed: "A society will be a better human community in which giv-
ing and receiving is the rule, not taking for the sake of good to come." Id.
136. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439. See also Brattebo et al., supra note 128, at
128.
137. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439. When intubation is performed incorrectly,
usually due to a lack of experience or skill, there are several risks. Id. The primary risk is
failure to revive a patient who may otherwise be resuscitated, but there is also the very real
possibility of unnecessary "precipitation of respiratory arrest or death." Id. Additionally,
"unskilled attempts at intubation may so damage and distort the victim's anatomy that
subsequent attempts by skilled and competent persons, to save the patient's life" may
prove futile. Id.
138. Brattebo et al., supra note 128, at 128.
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serve as adequate substitutes for a living or recently dead body.139 Newly
deceased patients also are ideal because there are no risks to them. 140
One basic objection to this rationale is that although the concerns may
be genuine, they still do not justify bypassing consent. 4' Doctors in favor
of the practice do support some restrictions, such as only permitting non-
mutilating procedures,'142 but this does not respond adequately to con-
cerns regarding consent.
One physician, Dr. Robert Matz, takes the position that the need for
intubation training, and its ultimate use in the field, is not nearly as dire
as others have indicated. 43 He suggests that emergency intubation
should be done only by "extremely skilled personnel," and proposes that
a less demanding "bag-and-mask" technique of ventilation would provide
adequate 'air passage for patients in most instances. 144 This argument,
supporting the elimination of intubation practice on newly deceased pa-
tients, invites attack, however, because as he acknowledged, ventilation is
not always an appropriate alternative to intubation.'4 5 His suggestion
fails to explain how anyone could receive adequate intubation training.
Dr. Orlowski questions, "where [are] personnel who are skilled in intuba-
tion techniques and who have 'long years of practice'. . . going to come
from in the future.' 46 One possible response to Dr. Orlowski's concern
139. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439. Many doctors find the real anatomy and
precise degree of tissue resilience of a newly deceased patient impossible to mimic in any
model. Brattebo et al., supra note 128, at 128. Others see only limited value in working
with mannequins because their heads "offer[ ] an experience that differs markedly from
that of intubating live or newly dead structures." Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2361. In
Ohio, trainees practiced on cats, but due to "rapidly rising costs, complex federal regula-
tions, and the possibility of adverse publicity from animal rights activists," the practice was
terminated. Id.
140. Bums et al., supra note 2, at 1653. Autopsies performed on newly deceased, intu-
bated infants revealed no significant damage to the airway distinguishable from that caused
by respiratory measures taken while the child was living. Benfield et al., supra note 16, at
2362.
141. "Sustaining life is an urgent argument for any measure, but not if that measure
destroys those very qualities that make life worth sustaining." Willard Gaylin, Harvesting
the Dead, in Bioethics: Basic Writings on the Key Ethical Questions that Surround the
Major, Modem Biological Possibilities and Problems 413, 423 (Thomas A. Shannon ed.,
1976).
142. Bums et al., supra note 2, at 1654.
143. Letter from Robert Matz to Editor, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 396, 396 (1989).
144. Id.
145. Orlowski et al., supra note 20, at 397 (indicating that "bag and mask" ventilation
also requires special training, and that intubation may still be preferable because of the
benefits it produces).
146. Id.
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is that the skills might be obtained through training sessions performed
on newly deceased patients after family consent has been secured.
C Societal Interests
Advocates who support the position that family consent is not neces-
sary believe that society's interests may, at times, prevail over the inter-
ests of the individual.147 The general population will benefit from better
trained medical personnel; thus according to their argument, an individ-
ual's right to consent or withhold consent must, at times, be compro-
mised.148 Dr. Orlowski further implies that society's needs are even more
dominant when the "individual" is no longer living.' 49 This position mir-
rors an "ends justifies the means" philosophy"' ° because the technique of
tracheal intubation is minimally invasive and the benefit to society is im-
mense. 151 Some doctors argue that although respect for the dead is im-
portant, "one had better not sentimentalize the newly dead body as a
symbol of the deceased at the expense of real .'people out there
suffering. '152
147. Id. at 396; Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 440-41; Bums et al., supra note 2, at
1653.
148. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 441 (noting, however, that the patients would have
an opportunity to object through advance directive and information regarding the
procedure).
149. Id.
"One may never use another person for one's own purposes." This principle is
universal in scope (it excludes no one) and absolute in application (there are ho
exceptions). However, its application assumes that one is a person. A dead body
is no longer a person. Even though corpses must be respected because they were
once living persons, the obligation of respect has less force than when it is applied
to living persons. In the case of intubating newly dead bodies, the respect is lim-
ited to avoiding disfigurement or ridicule of the cadaver.
Id. (citation omitted).
150. Michael J. Newton, Moral Dilemmas in Surgical Training: Intent and the Case for
Ethical Ambiguity, 12 J. MED. ETHIcs 207, 207 (1986)(suggesting that some medical train-
ees believe that "the individual's right to the best available care can be subordinated to the
more general need for skilled physicians in the future"). Dr. George Kanoti, Chairman of
the Department of Bioethics at Cleveland Clinic Foundation argues that it is ethical to use
a body to teach intubation without consent "if the family [can] not be found in time."
Kolata, supra note 121, at A22. Kanoti acknowledges the controversial stance he is taking,
yet he argues that sometimes individual rights must be compromised for the social good.
Id.
151. See supra notes 147-49, and accompanying text.
152. William F. May, Religious Justifications for Donating Body Parts, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 38. See also Feinberg, supra note 6, at 32. In addressing organ
transplants, Feinberg comments:
[A] newly dead human body is a sacred symbol of a real person, but to respect the
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Another commentator expressed her concern for the good of society in
saying: "the individual has responsibilities of mutual aid and benefit to-
ward the community, the rejection of which is a form of ingratitude and a
denial of dependency."' 53 In this vein, proponents might ask, what better
way to give something back to the community than allowing minimally
invasive procedures that yield such positive results?154
On the other hand, there are individuals with a deeply rooted fear of
the sacrifice of personal rights in the name of the common good. 55 One
extreme expression of this fear is embodied in Willard Gaylin's poignant
article, Harvesting the Dead.'56  Gaylin envisions a futuristic
"bioemporium" where row upon row of brain dead, but respirator sup-
ported, bodies, he calls "neomorts," would be maintained and put to vari-
ous medical uses. 157 The neomorts would serve not only as training,
testing, and experimentation tools, but would also be "harvested" for var-
ious commercially marketable materials such as blood, bone marrow, and
organs.'58
Gaylin predicts that neomorts dramatically would enhance medical
training and research while at the same time benefitting innumerable pa-
tients.' 59 In addition, he argues that the bioemporiums would not only
pay for themselves through commercially profitable enterprises, but
would also decrease dramatically what today have become exorbitant
health care expenses. 6 Undoubtedly, Gaylin's "Brave New World" type
of vision is shocking to the conscience, even for Gaylin himself:
And yet, after all the benefits are outlined, with the lifesaving
potential clear, the humanitarian purposes obvious, the technol-
ogy ready, the motive pure, and the material costs justified -
how are we to reconcile our emotions? Where in this debit-
symbol by banning autopsies and research on cadavers is to deprive living human
beings of the benefits of medical knowledge and condemn unknown thousands to
illnesses and deaths that might have been prevented. That is a poor sort of "re-
spect" to show a sacred symbol.
Id. He also brings up an interesting question in the context of organ donation as to
whether a dying person or his next of kin should or do have the legal right to deny another
the use of his organs after he has died a natural death. Id.
153. Campbell, supra note 35, at 39.
154. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439.
155. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1653. See also Stryker, supra note 6, at 396.
156. Gaylin, supra note 141, at 418-20.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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credit ledger of limbs and livers and kidneys and costs are we to
weigh and enter the repugnance generated by the entire philan-
thropic endeavor? 161
While his scenario can be disregarded as clearly science fiction, and
something that we would never resort to in our "civilized society," a re-
cent real life occurrence in California serves as a reminder of the fine line
between societal good and the breakdown of moral ethics.
In 1978, in an effort to more accurately measure the degree of passen-
ger protection in automobiles, researchers, with the consent of the next of
kin, used human cadavers in the place of crash test dummies. 162 Upon
learning of this practice, a California congressman forwarded "an angry
letter to the Secretary of Transportation charging that 'the use of human
cadavers for vehicle safety research violates fundamental notions of mo-
rality and human dignity, and must therefore permanently be
stopped. ' "1 63 Despite the Department's protest that banning this practice
would "set back" safety protection progress, the use of cadavers was dis-
continued permanently."6 Interestingly, the events in California suggest
that even with family consent, there are some practices that an ethical
society will not accept, no matter what the benefits may be for society.
D. Doctors: Protecting Patients, Society and Themselves
Some argue that only in emergency situations can doctors justify per-
forming invasive procedures without consent.165 The rationale is that the
urgency excuses the need for securing consent prior to acting. 166 There
are no "life threatening" concerns with a deceased patient, and thus con-
sent should be a prerequisite to teaching intubation on their bodies.
Another argument against the sacrifice of individual interests in the
name of society is based upon the fear that a blanket excuse will result in
medical practitioners and lay citizens alike losing sight of their ethical
responsibilities to humanity. 167 Arguably, bypassing consent prior to in-
vading the human body may start the medical profession, and society in
161. Id. at 421.
162. Feinberg, supra note 6, at 31.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Abramson, supra note 11, at 2829.
166. Id.
167. Newton, supra note 150, at 209. In discussing the ethics of surgical training on
patients, Michael Newton is certain that the ability to act correctly is dependant on an
individual's personal sense of ethical intent, and not on external authority or fear of rule
violation. Id. He fears that by granting unchecked authority to act for the good of society,
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general, down a path ultimately leading to the dehumanized environment
depicted in Gaylin's bioemporiums. Advocates of pulling back the reins
warn, "'act so that you treat humanity... always as an end and never as a
means only.' 168
One justification for an exception to the requirement of informed con-
sent is the idea that, in asking, doctors would "violate the moment. 169
At a time of emotional trauma physicians do not want to offend the fam-
ily or add to their grief.170 Requesting consent arguably could make a
bad situation worse; however, Dr. Benfield's study reported no such re-
sults: "We did not observe any unusual family reactions to suggest that
our requests for consent might have been emotionally upsetting or harm-
ful in other ways.' 171
Dr. William Meadows, a neonatologist and ethicist at the University of
Chicago, argues that requesting consent of a family who has just suffered
the death of their infant would simply be too insensitive.172 Interestingly,
it is not clear who the request would be more stressful for-the family or
the doctor. Some physicians acknowledge that requesting consent to per-
form teaching exercises on newly deceased patients puts them in an un-
comfortable position, and that they would prefer not having to approach
the family with the request. 173 The fact that physicians would rather not
have to approach the family is not a justification for bypassing consent. If
consent is required, then the doctors will simply have to reckon with this
difficult part of their jobs.
Doctors Tachakra, Robinson, and Mitchell, of London, England, sug-
gest that requesting consent may be inappropriate for doctors in an emer-
gency room setting.' 74 The reasoning behind this is that they do not have
physicians may be tempted to hide behind this shield instead of grappling adequately with
the ethical questions involved. Id.
168. Id. at 208.
169. Kolata, supra note 121, at A22 (quoting Dr. William Meadows, neonatologist and
ethicist at University of Chicago).
170. Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 440. "[Mlany health care providers will not ap-
proach a patient or family to obtain consent because they consider it inappropriate and
insensitive to do so." Id.
171. Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2362. Similarly, in Dr. McNamara's study, unfa-
vorable response to the consent request was noted in only 18 of 44 instances. In several
cases families were positive, finding a sense of worth in an otherwise tragic occurrence.
McNamara et al., supra note 62, at 311.
172. Kolata, supra note 121, at A22.
173. Id. See also Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2363.
174. Tachakra et al., supra note 120, at 1649.
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time to develop a rapport with the patient's family.175 Dr. Benfield's
study shows, however, that of the families who gave consent to use their
newly deceased infants, thirty-eight percent of the infants died within ten
hours after admission to the ICU, and twelve percent died within two
hours. 176 Several of those families granted consent even over the
phone.177 This evidence suggests a lack of correlation between duration
of the doctor-patient relationship and a family's willingness to consent.
In another study by Dr. McNamara, three medical personnel who
spoke with families of newly deceased patients were asked to rate their
own level of comfort in requesting the consent. 178 The two physicians
studied reported feeling comfortable ninety-six percent of the time,
whereas the one student nurse studied felt comfortable only eleven per-
cent of the time.'79 Interestingly, although she felt uneasy making the
request, the student nurse was able to secure consent fifty-five percent of
the time.' 80 The conclusion may be drawn that requesting consent may
not be "easy," but this fact does not necessarily bear on whether consent
ultimately will be granted.
Another reason for requiring consent prior to using newly deceased
patients for teaching intubation is to combat mistrust of the medical pro-
fession. 81 No one can deny the importance and contributions of the
work of physicians, yet a tenor of skepticism toward the profession histor-
ically has permeated society. 182 The combination of doubt and fear is
sure to be aggravated when evidence suggests that doctors are not dis-
closing information, or even worse, that they are taking medical liberties
with patients without first obtaining consent.
Doctors who support the consent requirement realize that the whole
issue presents risks to their reputation, and they argue that in order to
protect their profession from further erosion of trust in the eyes on the
public, they must secure the family's acceptance before using a deceased
175. Id. But see Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2362. Some health practitioners report
increased emotional difficulty when intubating a patient they have treated for some time.
Id. This suggests that anonymity or a less intimate relationship with the patient and family
could actually ease the emotional stress of the situation. Id.
176. Letter from D. Gary Benfield, M.D. et al., to Editor, 266 JAMA 1649, 1650 (1991).
177. Id.
178. McNamara et al., supra note 62, at 311.
179. Id.
180. Id. One doctor reported a success rate of 70%, and the other, 33%. Id.
181. Stryker, supra note 6, at 396.
182. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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patient as a teaching tool.183 The results of Dr. Gary Benfield's study
imply that people want to trust and to assist physicians-as is evidenced
by the large number of families who did consent when asked, and by the
"common theme" expressed by consenting families of a willingness to
consent "if it will help [physicians] to help other babies in the future."'"
In order to maintain this willingness, families must feel that their consent
is necessary prior to doctors performing any procedures.
E. Respect for Religious Convictions
Although the tenants of many religions view the body as sacred, a tem-
ple, a sanctuary, or a gift "on loan" from God, 185 the treatment of the
body with reverence is not unique to religious faith. Societal beliefs in
general, regarding the sacredness of the human body, command that it be
treated with dignity and forethought.'86 The effect a medical procedure
has on the integrity of the body is tantamount in the deliberation regard-
ing its value. "The body commands a form of respect or reverence in-
dependent of the instrumental uses to which it may be put."'1 87 This
moral expectation continues to exert itself after death. 188 Consequently,
183. Bums et al., supra note 2, at 1653. See also Stryker, supra note 6, at 396. In dis-
cussing the use of brain-dead patients for teaching, Dr. Stryker expresses concern that if
consent is presumed, then public confidence in the medical profession and in hospitals as
institutions of healing will be at stake. Id. Dr. Guttorm Brattebo of Norway believes that
in his country, the medical community has been reluctant to publicly acknowledge or dis-
cuss intubation teaching on the newly dead for fear of public criticism. Letter from Gut-
torm Brattebo et al., to Editor, 266 JAMA 1649, 1650 (1991). There is a fear that because
biomedical research has become so commercialized, the research community has shifted its
focus from healing, to a sophisticated business that takes advantage of individuals. Camp-
bell, supra note 35, at 37.
184. Benfield et al., supra note 16, at 2361. Dr. Benfield's study found that 73% of the
families consented when asked if their newly dead infants could be used to teach intuba-
tion. Id. at 2360.
185. See Campbell, supra note 35, at 38. "'Your body, you know, is the temple of the
Holy Spirit, who is in you since you received him from God. You are not your own prop-
erty; you have been bought and paid for. That is why you should use your body for the
glory of God."' Id. (quoting I Cor. 6:19, 20).
186. Id. at 35; May, supra note 152, at 38-42.
["Me] association of the self with the body does not terminate abruptly with death.
Admittedly the corpse is no longer a man or woman. The cadaver is a kind of
shroud that masks rather than expresses the soul that once animated it. Yet while
the body retains a recognizable form, even in death, it commands the respect of
identity. No longer a human presence, it still reminds us of the presence that
once was utterly inseparable from it.
Id. at 39.
187. Campbell, supra note 35, at 37.
188. Id. at 35.
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the need for reverence cannot be separated out when contemplating the
use of newly deceased bodies for teaching purposes.
The Christian Science religion denies all medical intervention, prefer-
ring the pursuit of spirituality over wellness of the physical body.189 In
contrast, Lutherans hold as a matter of faith that life should be preserved,
regardless of cost.19 ° Other Christian groups occupy a broad range of
beliefs. Some believe that the self-donation sacrifice allows them to give
entirely of themselves as Christ did.19 1 Others believe that it is necessary
to preserve the body that God created in his own image in anticipation of
resurrection.' 92 This wide spectrum of beliefs can only be honored prop-
erly by a medical profession that respects individual choice at every level
of intervention. For this reason, intubation practices on newly deceased
patients can coexist with all religious faiths only if informed consent is
required and is granted by the patient's family.
IV. PROPOSED PROCEDURES
The interest of the medical profession in using newly deceased patients
to teach resuscitation techniques and the right of the family to consent to
such uses need not be at odds with each other. The two can coexist har-
moniously through implementation of a structured policy. Hospitals
should be required to ask families for consent and to restrict the practice
itself to "structured learning sequence[s], rather than opportunistic and
sporadic event[s]."' 93
Families must be treated with compassion, and their refusal to consent
must be accepted without debate or coercion, either stated or implied. In
the interest of informing future patients and families of the request that
189. May, supra note 152, at 39.
190. John A. Most, Autonomy and Rights: Dignity and Right, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 473, 475 (1995).
191. May, supra note 152, at 42.
192. Id. at 41-42.
In Jewish Law, except for a situation of saving a community or the act of saving
another person's life, it is not permissible to tamper in any way with another
person's body.... Rabbi Silverman of the "B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation, Uni-
versity of Maryland," stated that "Judaism is very, very strong and very adamant
in maintaining the purification and the wholeness and completeness of the
body.... God himself views the sanctity of a body, in its completeness it should
be returned to the ground.... God takes the soul away, but the body is to remain
in perfect condition and treated with the utmost respect, more so than one's living
body."
Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
193. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1654.
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one day may be asked of them, health professionals should bring the issue
to the public's attention, as has been done recently with organ donation.
This exposure would provide people with the occasion to consider how
they would respond to such a request. If the actual situation subse-
quently were to present itself, then the family will have had the opportu-
nity to consider whether or not to grant consent, and hopefully the
request itself will not be met with shock or outrage.
If consent is granted, the resuscitation practice must be performed
under close supervision, in an environment of solemnity and respect, and
only by persons who need genuinely to learn and develop these skills.
194
This training should be the last step in a structured educational program
preceded by textbook study and practice on a mannequin or other substi-
tute. 195 When these requirements have been met, consent must then be
secured for each type of resuscitation training to be practiced, and only
those practices that would not mutilate the body should be requested.196
V. CONCLUSION
Doctors and hospitals are violating patients' families' rights by invad-
ing, without invitation, the most sacred of all objects: the human body.
While there are several medically appropriate and legitimate reasons for
using newly deceased patients in resuscitation training, none can over-
come the importance of first obtaining the families' approval. In a society
where biomedical technology is making remarkable strides, there persists
a fear of the unknown that can be calmed only by ensuring informed
consent. The medical profession must be concerned with its obligations
to both the deceased patient as well as the family. "When the human
body is invaded nonconsensually ... [,] the injustice is not only to the
body, but also to the person who has wrongfully been denied a voice in
the matter. 197
The importance of using newly dead patients in clinical training is un-
deniable. So, too, is the right of the family to grant or withhold consent
to such use. In light of the possible legal consequences for hospitals and
doctors, the evidence that families are often willing to consent to intuba-
tion training on newly deceased patients, and the policy arguments that
demand consent, there is no need for the current trend of bypassing con-
194. See Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439; see also Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1654.
195. See Orlowski et al., supra note 2, at 439; see also Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1654.
196. Burns et al., supra note 2, at 1654.
197. Campbell, supra note 35, at 37.
19971
612 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:581
sent to continue. If the suggested protocol from this article were imple-
mented today, medical educators and citizens alike could feel confident
that trainees are still getting the education they need, but not at the ex-
pense of informed consent.
Alice Fleury Kerns
